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GENOMICS MONITOR – ISSUE 1 
 
Aims of the Monitor 
 
• To provide regularly updated information and analysis on 
developments in the international regulations relevant to the control of 
the biotechnology revolution. 
• To highlight the connections, in applicability to biotechnology, between 
regulations in the areas of arms control, health and disease control, 
environmental protection, trade, drugs control, development, and social 
and ethical impacts of human genetics. 
• To raise awareness of the scope and limitations of the current 
regulation in this area. 
 
Aims of the Introductory Issue 
 
To provide an overview of the international standards, guidelines, codes and 
treaties that are relevant to the control of the biotechnology revolution. 
 
Importance of this Area 
 
Current information sources on the international regulation of biotechnology 
are very limited.  Four years ago a website (www.genomics-gateway.net) was 
established to bring together, in one central location, information on all the 
international regulations in this area, with links provided to the official texts.  A 
more thorough study of developments in this area is now provided through the 
Monitor, to inform all those working in this area of current issues and debates 
and of the status of the regulations.  Its value lies in the range of information it 
provides on the regulations, its emphasis on the interconnections between the 
regulations, and highlighting of debates that cut across regulatory areas.  It 
will provide a central authoritative source for anyone interested in this area. 
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Acknowledgements 
 
The development and production of the Monitor is made possible through a 
grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, as part of the work of the 
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, based in the Department of Peace 
Studies at Bradford University.  The Department and Centre have a long 
history of work in this area, producing over the last ten years series of Briefing 
Papers, Review Conference Papers, Evaluation Papers, and Science and 
Technology Reports connected to the project on Strengthening the Biological 
Weapons Convention.  Recognising the links between regulation of 
biotechnology in the arms control area and wider international regulation of 
biotechnology, work on exploring these connections began four years ago 
with the development of the Genomics Gateway Website. 
 
Structure of the Introductory Issue 
 
As the inaugural issue of the Genomics Monitor, this issue will focus on 
introducing the international regulations applicable to the control of 
biotechnology.  First, a general section will provide an overview of the 
regulations, and then the key aims and provisions of each regulation will be 
outlined, within seven issue areas.  Future issues will focus predominantly on 
developments in the regulations, cross-cutting work by international 
organisations, emerging issues, and relevant work by other groups.  As this 
issue is being launched just before the Sixth Review Conference of the 
Biological Weapons Convention, a section is included which summarises the 
document Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Key Points for 
the Sixth Review Conference2.  Towards the end of the issue information on 
forthcoming events and recent publications is provided. 
                                                 
2 Graham S. Pearson, Nicholas A. Sims & Malcolm R. Dando (eds), Strengthening the Biological 
Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Sixth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department 
of Peace Studies, September 2006.  Accessible through: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc.  
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PART I – REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
1) AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
The term regulation is used in the Monitor to cover a range of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
international legal instruments including voluntary standards, guidelines and 
codes, and legally-binding treaties.  All of these documents have relevance for 
the guidance of state policy on biotechnology. 
 
The biotechnology revolution and its impacts are global, and international 
regulation is an essential part of its effective control because it facilitates 
coordinated state action.  There are seven main international issue areas in 
which biotechnology has significant applications and impacts, for which such 
coordinated action is vital.  They are: arms control; health and disease control; 
environmental protection; trade; drugs control; development; and the social 
and ethical impacts of human genetics. These issue areas form the structure 
of the main sections of the Monitor – although there are not regulations 
specific to the development aspects of biotechnology, instead many of the 
regulations in the other issue areas incorporate development related clauses.   
 
Within these issue areas there are currently around 35 international 
regulations applicable to biotechnology.  These regulations largely developed 
in separation from one another.  They also developed at different times (from 
1925 to the present).  Of those which are legally-binding, state participation 
varies from 14 to 192.  There are also fourteen international organisations that 
operate across the issue areas.  There is some awareness of the connections 
between some of the regulations, but not necessarily in terms of their 
applicability to biotechnology.  In addition the connections across the full 
range of regulations are rarely recognised.  It is important that this awareness 
is increased because currently there are a number of tensions, imbalances, 
gaps and weaknesses that need to be addressed – and which cannot be fully 
seen without examining the regulations as a whole set. 
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2) ARMS CONTROL 
 
Relevance of the Area to Control of Biotechnology 
 
For any state to feel secure in limiting its own capabilities, it needs 
assurances that others are doing the same.  For this reason, much arms 
control takes place at the international level.  Alongside the many benefits of 
modern biotechnology, there is potential for deliberate misuse.  This is a 
significant concern in regard to the development and production of biological 
agents for hostile purposes.  The international arms control agreements of 
relevance to preventing the hostile use of biotechnology (while facilitating 
peaceful research) are:  
 
• The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare; 
• The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction;  
• The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; 
and 
• The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modification Techniques.   
 
Each is outlined below. 
 
The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
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This brief document noted that a prohibition on the use in war of “asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices” 
was already contained in international treaties, and it extended this prohibition 
to “bacteriological methods of warfare”.  The Protocol, despite being adopted 
over eighty years ago, remains relevant today, because it bans the use of 
biological weapons – the later Biological Weapons Convention does so only 
through reference to the Protocol. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The Protocol entered into force in 1928 and has 132 States Parties.  It is now 
generally accepted to be part of customary international law, which makes it 
binding on all states whether they are parties to it or not, and most previous 
reservations to the Protocol (which rendered it essentially a ‘no-first-use’ 
treaty) have now been withdrawn. 
 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) prohibits the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and – through 
reference to the Geneva Protocol – use of: 
 
“(1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever 
their origin or method of production, of types or in quantities 
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to 
use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed 
conflict.” 
(Article 1) 
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 States also agree to destroy or convert to peaceful use all such agents, toxins 
and equipment (Article 2) and not to permit their transfer (Article 3).  The 
provisions of the BTWC apply equally to agents and toxins produced by or 
consisting of genetically engineered organisms, or through other 
biotechnology techniques – as can be seen in the following section. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
It was recognised during negotiation that new scientific developments might 
have an effect on the operation of the Convention and Article 12 instructs that 
the parties “take into account any new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention.”  The Review Conferences (with 
the exception of the 5th) through the production of final declarations have built 
up understandings on the Convention’s provisions.  In terms of scientific 
developments, the Final Declaration of the 4th Review Conference stated: 
 
“The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from 
relevant scientific and technological developments, inter alia, 
in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, molecular biology, 
genetic engineering, and any applications resulting from 
genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the 
Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States 
Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.” 
 
The Review Conferences have also established confidence building 
measures (CBMs) to enhance confidence in compliance with the Convention.  
Through this, states are invited to submit annual declarations covering such 
matters as: national biological defence programmes; infectious disease 
outbreaks; legislative measures; past activities; and vaccine production 
facilities.  
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A further attempt to enhance confidence in the Convention has been in the 
investigation of potential verification mechanisms (by the VEREX Group of 
Technical Experts in 1992 and 1993) and subsequent negotiation of a 
protocol to strengthen the BTWC (through the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental 
Experts from 1994-2001).  While a Protocol was negotiated, the US withdrew 
its support from this process in 2001 and it was not adopted, as intended, at 
the 5th Review Conference in November that year.  The 5th Review 
Conference was reconvened in November 2002, but the process of 
negotiating an appropriate instrument was not renewed.  Instead a set of 
three Inter-Review Conference meetings was agreed discussing:  
 
“i. the adoption of necessary national measures to implement 
the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the 
enactment of penal legislation;  
ii. national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security 
and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins;  
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, 
investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use 
of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of 
disease;  
iv. strengthening and broadening national and international 
institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the 
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious 
diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants;  
v. the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of 
conduct for scientists.” 
 
The Sixth Review Conference meets from the 20th November – 8th December 
2006 and it is expected to produce a Final Declaration that reviews the 
Convention’s provisions.  A summary of Key Points for the Sixth Review 
Conference, is provided in a separate section of the Monitor. 
 
The BTWC was adopted in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.  It has 155 
States Parties. 
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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are also relevant 
to the control of biotechnology because they cover toxins, which can be 
produced through biological processes.  Graham Pearson (2001, p.6) set out 
the overlapping coverage of the CWC and BTWC in the CBW Spectrum: 
 
 
 
The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, 
retention, use or preparation to use chemical weapons.  Chemical weapons 
being defined as:  
 
“the following, together or separately: 
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where 
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, 
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such 
purposes; 
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(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause 
death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic 
chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be 
released as a result of the employment of such munitions and 
devices; 
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in 
connection with the employment of munitions and devices 
specified in subparagraph (b).” 
(Article II.1) 
 
Peaceful uses of toxic chemicals and their precursors are allowed under the 
Convention’s general purpose criterion (Article II.9). 
 
The CWC has detailed provisions on monitoring compliance.  States are 
required to give declarations on any chemical weapons and production 
facilities held prior to their adopting the Convention, and on their destruction 
(Article III).  Declarations are also required on scheduled chemicals, their 
precursors and related facilities (Article VI).  (Dual-use chemicals are listed in 
three schedules in an annex to the Convention.)  All declarations are made to 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – and oversight and 
administration body established by the Convention. 
 
The Convention also has detailed verification provisions and mechanisms for 
on-site inspections.  An Annex on Verification gives further details on the 
declaration requirements and guidance on the conduct of verification activities. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The CWC was adopted in 1993 and entered into force in 1997; it has 180 
States Parties. 
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Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
In the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (EnMod Convention) states agreed: 
 
“not to engage in military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques having widespread, 
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, 
damage or injury to any other state party.” 
 
The Convention, in Article 2, defines environmental modification techniques 
as:  
 
“any technique for changing – through the deliberate 
manipulation of natural processes – the dynamics, 
composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, 
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.” 
 
In contrast to the Geneva Protocol, BTWC and CWC, the EnMod Convention 
does not prohibit a particular type of weapon, but a particular use of weaponry.  
Although the Convention was adopted in 1977, it applies to scientific 
developments since then, its preamble specifically recognising “that scientific 
and technical advances may open up new possibilities with respect to 
modification of the environment.” 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The EnMod Convention has received only limited international support, which 
may be due to flaws in the Convention (among other things its definition of 
environmental modification techniques gives it very restricted scope).  It was 
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adopted in 1977 and entered into force in 1978.  It has 70 States Parties.  
Review conferences, which under Article VIII of the Convention should have 
taken place every five years, have only been held twice – in 1986 and 1992. 
 
 
References/Links: 
 
Official Texts: 
 
1925 Geneva Protocol – http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Genev-
Prot.html.  
 
Biological Weapons Convention – access through http://www.opbw.org/. 
 
Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Documents – access 
through http://www.opbw.org/. 
 
Existing Confidence Building Measures for the Biological Weapons 
Convention – access through http://www.opbw.org/.  
 
Chemical Weapons Convention – access through http://www.opcw.org/. 
 
EnMod Convention – http://www.fas.org/nuke/contro/enmod/text/environ2.htm. 
 
Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference Documents – access 
through http://www.opcw.org/. 
 
 
Official Organisations: 
 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – http://www.opcw.org/. 
 
 
Others: 
 
Genomics Gateway Website, http://www.genomics-gateway.net. 
 
Harvard Sussex Programme on Chemical and Biological Weapons, 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Unites/spru/hsp/. 
 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Biotechnology, Weapons and 
Humanity Appeal, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/bwh?OpenDocument.  
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Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons – site administered by 
the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford – 
http://www.opbw.org. 
 
Pearson, Graham, S., “New Scientific and Technological Developments of 
Relevance to the Fifth Review Conference”, SBTWC Review Conference 
Paper No. 3, http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/rcp3.pdf. 
 
Project on Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/. 
 
Rhodes, Catherine, (May 2005), International Control of the Biotechnology 
Revolution – Working Paper 1 – International Arms Control Agreements of 
Relevance to the Control of the Biotechnology Revolution, 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/gateway/ARMS/workingpaper1.htm. 
 
SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Project, 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/cbwarfare/. 
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3) HEALTH AND DISEASE CONTROL 
 
Relevance of the Area to the Control of Biotechnology 
 
Biotechnology has many applications in the area of health care and 
international regulation can help to promote the international exchange of 
beneficial knowledge, research, technology and end products.  Disease 
control rules can assist in the identification, containment and response to any 
serious infectious disease outbreaks, including any that involve genetically 
engineered pathogens, whether deliberate or unintentional.  Also for the 
protection of health, certain aspects of food safety are regulated 
internationally, and rules that cover genetically modified foods are relevant.  
 
 
Disease Control Regulations 
 
International Health Regulations 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The International Health Regulations (IHR) aim to protect human health on an 
international basis by limiting the international spread of infectious diseases.  
The 1969 version, which is currently in force, focuses on the reporting of 
outbreaks of cholera, plague and yellow fever.  The scope of the IHR has 
been significantly expanded in the 2005 Revised Version – in force from May 
2007 – to cover all “public health emergencies of international concern”.  A 
public health emergency of international concern is defined in Article 1 of the 
IHR as: 
 
“an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in 
these Regulations 
(i) to constitute a public health risk to other states through the 
international spread of disease and 
(ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response.” 
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 States are instructed to establish ‘core capacities’, including: surveillance; 
detection; verification; notification; determination of control measures; and 
response to public health emergencies (these are detailed in Annex 1 of the 
IHR).  They include capacities at ports, airports and ground-crossings.  On 
receiving notification of a public health emergency the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) will take action to determine whether such is occurring, 
how to respond, and when the emergency can be considered to have ended 
(Article 12).  Measures will always be designed to be the least restrictive 
possible, particularly with a view to minimising disruption to travel and trade. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The process of revising the International Health Regulations began in 1995 
and was completed in May 2005 when a revised version was adopted.  This 
will enter into force in May 2007 and states are expected to have established 
the core capacities by 2012.  There are currently 192 States Parties to the 
IHR.  They are overseen by the World Health Organisation. 
 
The Terrestrial and Aquatic Animal Health Codes 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
These two regulations aim to control the international spread of animal 
diseases for the protection of both animal and human health.  They include 
general guidance on how to treat imports and exports of animals and animal 
products.  They operate on the basis of listed diseases, outbreaks of which 
must be reported to the Central Bureau of the Office International des 
Epizooties (OIE – also known as the World Animal Health Organisation). 
 
States should apply risk analysis to imports of animals and animal products.  
This analysis is expected to include: hazard identification; assessment of the 
probability of release; assessment of the probability of exposure following 
release; and assessment of the consequences and their probability.  This 
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should result in a risk estimation, and suggested measures for risk 
management.  All imports are to be accompanied by international veterinary 
certificates that indicated freedom from any disease specified by the importing 
state. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The Codes are voluntary but membership of the international organisation 
which oversees them (the OIE) is currently 167 states.  The Codes are 
regularly revised: the Terrestrial Animal Health Code is in its 15th Edition; the 
Aquatic Animal Health Code in its 9th Edition. 
 
The International Plant Protection Convention 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is designed to control 
the international spread of plant pests and diseases, while minimising 
disruption to international trade.  It particularly focuses on the control of 
‘quarantine pests’ – those that are “of potential economic importance to the 
area endangered thereby and not yet present, or present but not widely 
distributed and being officially controlled.”  The precise definition will therefore 
be locally specific. 
 
National measures are implemented through National Plant Protection 
Organisations (NPPOs) established under the Convention.  NPPOs are 
responsible for, inter alia: 
 
• issuing phytosanitary certificates; 
• surveillance and inspection of plant products during cultivation, storage 
and transport (particularly international transport); 
• reporting outbreaks; imposing control measures; and 
• conducting pest risk analyses (Article IV.2).   
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 Pest risk analysis is to be used in decisions on implementing appropriate 
phytosanitary measures.  Phytosanitary certificates accompany all exports of 
plants and plant products, and are designed to indicate compliance with the 
standards of the importing state. 
 
The IPPC is recognised by the World Trade Organisation as an acceptable 
basis for protection measures under its Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  Standard-setting under the IPPC is 
undertaken by a Commission for Phytosanitary Measures (CPM).   
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The first version of the IPPC was adopted in 1951 and a revised version in 
1979.  The IPPC was revised again and a new version adopted in 1997.  The 
1997 version entered into force in October 2005.  The Commission on 
Phytosanitary Measures held its first meeting in April 2006.  Between 1997 
and 2005 its work was conducted under an Interim CPM.  27 International 
Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs) have been adopted by the 
CPM.  ISPM No. 11 on Pest Risk Analysis for Quarantine Pests gives 
guidance on the scope of the IPPC in relation to living modified organisms 
and how to determine whether they constitute a pest. The Convention is 
legally-binding and has 159 States Parties. 
 
WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The World Health Organisation’s Laboratory Biosafety Manual aims to 
minimise the risk of disease spread through accidental or deliberate release 
from laboratories. The Manual has eight main sections covering: biosafety 
guidelines; laboratory biosecurity; laboratory equipment; good microbiological 
techniques; introduction to biotechnology; chemical, fire and electrical safety; 
safety organisation and training; and safety checklists. 
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  The Manual uses four risk groups to classify agents: 
 
“Risk Group 1 (no or low individual and community risk) 
A microorganism that is unlikely to cause human or animal 
disease. 
Risk Group 2 (moderate individual risk, low community risk) 
A pathogen that can cause human or animal disease but is 
unlikely to be a serious hazard to laboratory workers, the 
community, livestock or the environment. Laboratory 
exposures may cause serious infection, but effective 
treatment and preventive measures are available and the risk 
of spread of infection is limited. 
Risk Group 3 (high individual risk, low community risk) 
A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal 
disease but does not ordinarily spread from one infected 
individual to another. Effective treatment and preventive 
measures are available. 
Risk Group 4 (high individual and community risk) 
A pathogen that usually causes serious human or animal 
disease and that can be readily transmitted from one 
individual to another, directly or indirectly. Effective treatment 
and preventive measures are not usually available.” 
(Reproduced from Table 1. Classification of infective 
microorganisms by risk group, page 1, Laboratory Biosafety 
Manual.) 
 
The classification of agents into the risk groups is to be done on a national or 
regional basis, as risk will vary depending on local conditions.  According to 
the risk group that an agent is in – work with that agent must take place in a 
laboratory designed and equipped to Biosafety Level 1, 2, 3 or 4, with 
cumulatively stringent biosafety requirements applying to each level. 
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Special consideration should be given to, “Any genetic manipulation of the 
organism that may alter the host range of the agent or alter the agent’s 
sensitivity to known, effective treatment regimes.” (Chapter 2).  There is also a 
specific chapter in the Manual that focuses on Biosafety and Recombinant-
DNA Technology (Chapter 16) and another that deals with Laboratory 
Biosecurity Concepts (Chapter 9). 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The Laboratory Biosafety Manual is a voluntary guidance document, 
published as part of the WHO’s Biosafety Programme.  The 3rd Edition was 
published in 2004.  It expanded coverage of biotechnology issues.  The 
advice on biosecurity was new to the 2004 Edition, it has now been 
supplemented with a document, Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance, published 
by the WHO in September 2006 – which will be further discussed in the next 
issue of the Genomics Monitor.  The WHO has 192 member states. 
 
 
WHO Guidance on Regulations for the Transport of Infectious 
Substances 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
This document aims to minimise the risk of disease spread from accidental 
release of infectious substances during transport.  It provides a synthesis of 
requirements from modal dangerous goods regulations (e.g. the International 
Maritime Dangerous Goods Code) which are all based on the UN Model 
Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. 
 
Infectious substances are divided into two categories for the purpose of the 
Guidance.  Category A covers any substance “in a form that, when exposure 
to it occurs, is capable of causing permanent disability, life-threatening or fatal 
disease in otherwise healthy humans or animals”.  Substances that do not 
meet this definition come under Category B. 
18 
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 The Guidance focuses on ensuring that infectious substances are correctly 
identified, packaged and labelled for transport.  Substances are assigned UN 
numbers and shipping names, used in labelling to allow rapid identification.  
For example a substance in Category A that affects only humans is ‘UN 2814 
INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCE, AFFECTING HUMANS’.  The packing guidance 
for Category A and B substances closely matches UN Packing Instructions 
P620 and P650 respectively, and these are reproduced in annexes to the 
Guidance.  In both cases, a basic triple packaging system is used as the 
starting point. 
 
Any personnel involved in the packaging, handling and/or transport of 
infectious substances should receive appropriate training.  Effective 
coordination between sender, carrier and receiver is vital to ensuring biosafety 
during transport, and the Guidance outlines specific responsibilities for each 
party. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The Guidance, with which compliance is voluntary, forms part of the WHO’s 
Biosafety Programme.  The WHO had 192 member states.  The Guidance 
was significantly revised and republished in September 2005.  It was 
previously titled Biosafety Guidelines for the Safe Transport of Infectious 
Substances and Diagnostic Specimens. 
 
 
OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 
and Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
These documents are designed to accompany the Terrestrial and Aquatic 
Animal Health Codes.  They are mainly concerned with quality management 
but also provide advice on human safety in veterinary microbiology 
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laboratories.  The Terrestrial Manual also contains sections on biotechnology 
in the diagnosis of infectious diseases and vaccine development (Chapter 
I.1.8) and on licensing of products derived through biotechnology, 
classification of biotechnology derived vaccines, and release of live 
recombinant-DNA products (Chapter I.1.7).  The second part of each Manual 
contains guidance specific to each OIE listed disease. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals is in its 
5th Edition, published in 2004.  The online version of the Manual has been 
updated more recently.  The Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals 
is also in its 5th Edition, published in 2006.  Both Manuals are voluntary 
guidance and are overseen by the OIE.  The OIE has 167 member states. 
 
Food Safety Regulations 
 
The Codex Alimentarius Principles and Guidelines on Food Derived 
From Modern Biotechnology 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is an international standard-setting body 
concerned with harmonising food safety rules.  In 2003 the Commission 
adopted three documents relating to safety aspects of foods derived from or 
produced using modern biotechnology: 
 
• Codex Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern 
Biotechnology; 
• Codex Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods 
Produced Using Recombinant-DNA Microorganisms; and 
• Codex Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods 
Derived From Recombinant-DNA Plants. 
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 The principles form “a framework for undertaking risk analysis on the safety 
and nutritional aspects of foods derived from modern biotechnology.” (Point 7).  
The Principles explain, specific to the particular context, what risk assessment 
is and describe its potential components – including hazard identification, risk 
management, risk communication, and post-market monitoring.  The general 
guidance they provide is applied more specifically in the two guidelines. 
 
The guidelines concern the conduct of food safety assessments.  They 
identify the information that is needed for an effective assessment and 
operate using a conventional counterpart to compare the novel food to.  The 
conventional counterpart will have history of safe use as a food, and therefore 
risk assessment is only concerned with additional or altered hazards.  A 
hazard is defined in the Codex Working Principles for Risk Analysis as “A 
biological, chemical or physical agent in, or condition of, food with the 
potential to cause an adverse health effect.” (Point 2).  The assessment will, 
at least, consider the characteristics of the recombinant-DNA plant/ 
microorganism, host plant/microorganism, and donor plant/microorganism; 
identify all transferred genetic material and expressed substances; and 
identify any toxic or allergenic effects and the impact of any nutritional 
modification. 
 
There is a particular concern, reflected in annexes to both guidelines, about 
potential allergenicity.  For recombinant-DNA microorganisms the 
immunological effects of interaction with gut microorganism must also be 
assessed, and the use of antibiotic resistant genetic material that might 
transfer to gut microorganisms is discouraged. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission was established by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and WHO in 1963 to oversee the development 
of harmonised international food safety standards.  It has developed over 
4800 standards, codes and recommendations over the past forty years.  
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Previous Codex principles for risk analysis focused on individual food 
components rather than whole foods, and so it was decided that separate 
guidance was required for genetically-modified foods.  This led to the adoption 
of the Principles and Guidelines in 2003.  The standards of the Codex 
Alimentarius are voluntary.  The Codex Alimentarius Commission has 170 
member states and one regional member (the EU). 
 
 
References/Links 
 
Official Texts: 
 
International Health Regulations – http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/. 
 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code – 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/en_mcode.htm.  
 
Aquatic Animal Health Code – http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/en_acode.htm. 
 
International Plant Protection Convention – 
https://www.ippc.int/servlet/BinaryDownloaderServlet/13742_1997_English.pd
f?filename=/publications/13742.New_Revised_Text_of_the_International_Pla
nt_Protectio.pdf&refID=13742.  
 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.doc. 
 
Laboratory Biosafety Manual – 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/en/Biosafety7.pdf. 
 
Guidance on Regulations for the Transport of Infectious Substances – 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_CSR_LY
O_2005_22%20.pdf. 
 
International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code – restricted access through 
http://www.imo.org/Safety/index.asp?topic_id=158. 
 
UN Model Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods – 
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev14/14files_e.html. 
 
Terrestrial Manual – http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/en_mmanual.htm. 
 
Aquatic Manual – http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/en_amanual.htm. 
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Codex Principles – 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/10007/CXG_044e.pdf. 
 
Codex Guideline Recombinant-DNA Microorganisms – 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/10025/CXG_046e.pdf. 
 
Codex Guideline Recombinant-DNA Plants – 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/10021/CXG_045e.pdf.  
 
 
Official Organisations: 
 
World Health Organisation – http://www.who.int/. 
 
Office International Des Epizooties – http://www.oie.int/. 
 
Food and Agriculture Organisation – http://www.fao.org/.  
 
International Plant Protection Convention Secretariat – http://www.ippc.int/. 
 
Commission on Phytosanitary Measures – 
https://www.ippc.int/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0xMzMzMCY2PWVuJjMz
PSomMzc9a29z.  
 
Codex Alimentarius Commission – http://www.codexalimentarius.net/.  
 
 
Others: 
 
WHO’s Biosafety Programme – 
http://www.who.int/csr/labepidemiology/projects/biosafety/en/.  
 
Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance – 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_200
6_6/en/index.html.  
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4) ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
 
Relevance of the Area to Control of Biotechnology 
 
Biotechnology has applications that may be beneficial to the environment, for 
example by reducing the amount of pesticides used on crops.  Other, and 
even the same, applications pose threats to the environment and particularly 
to biodiversity, due to potential effects on other plants, to untargeted insects 
and species further up the food chain. 
 
 
The Convention on Biodiversity 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) is a broad framework convention, 
dealing with all aspects of the protection of biodiversity: 
 
“The objectives of this Convention… are the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and 
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources.” 
(Article 1) 
 
It recognises that all technologies have the potential to contribute to 
biodiversity conservation but also that many pose threats.  Biotechnology is 
specifically included in its definition of technology in this context (Article 2).  A 
key tool for the protection of biodiversity recommended by the Convention is 
environmental impact assessment for any “proposed projects that are likely to 
have significant adverse effects on biological diversity” (Article 14).  This 
approach is more specifically applied to certain biotechnology applications in 
a Protocol to the Convention – the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
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Development and Current Status 
 
The CBD was adopted in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development.  It entered into force in 1993.  The 
Conference of the Parties, responsible for review and development of the 
Convention, has met eight times since then, most recently in March 2006.  
The Convention is legally-binding and has 189 States Parties. 
 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biodiversity 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The Cartagena Protocol gives practical application to the principles of the 
CBD in relation to transboundary movements of living modified organisms, 
which are defined as: “any living organism that possesses a novel 
combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern 
biotechnology” (Article 3.g). 
 
It principally operates through an advanced informed agreement mechanism 
through which states must give prior consent to transboundary movements of 
LMOs.  The notification given by the potential exporter contains details on the 
LMO and risk assessment of it.  Annex II to the Protocol gives full details on 
the content and conduct of risk assessments.  The importing state 
acknowledges receipt of the notification and is expected to reach a decision 
within 270 days, however failure to do so may not be read as implying 
consent.  Decisions are reported both to the exporter and to the Biosafety 
Clearing House (BCH).  The BCH is a mechanism established by the Protocol 
to facilitate information exchange – access is open to all online.  Where risks 
are identified in the assessment the importing state is expected to put 
measures in place to deal with them.  All states should have measures in 
place to prevent and penalise illegal transboundary movements. 
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For the purposes of the Protocol LMOs are divided into three categories: 
LMOs for deliberate release into the environment; LMOs for direct use in food 
or feed or food processing; and LMOs for contained use.  Each is treated 
differently in terms of the advance informed agreement procedure. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
Article 19.3 of the CBD instructed states to:  
 
“consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out 
appropriate procedures… in the field of the safe transfer, 
handling and use of any living modified organism resulting 
from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted in 2000 and entered into 
force in 2003.  Three Meetings of the Parties to the Protocol have been held 
so far, in February 2004, May-June 2005, and March 2006.  The Conference 
of the Parties to the CBD serves as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol.  
The Protocol is legally-binding and has 135 States Parties. 
 
 
References/Links 
 
Official Texts: 
 
Convention on Biodiversity – 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/convention.shtml. 
 
Cartagena Protocol – http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.shtml. 
 
Documents of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biodiversity 
– http://www.biodiv.org/convention/cops.shtml.  
 
Documents of the Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol – 
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/cop-mop/search.aspx?menu=mop3.  
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Official Organisations: 
 
Convention on Biodiversity Secretariat – http://www.biodiv.org/.  
 
 
Other: 
 
Biosafety Clearing House – http://bch.biodiv.org/.  
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5) TRADE 
 
Relevance of the Area to Control of Biotechnology 
 
There are three main trade-related areas that are of relevance to the 
international control of biotechnology.  First are rules on the reduction of 
barriers to trade which will apply to many biotechnology products.  Second are 
rules on intellectual property protection for innovative products and processes.  
Third are rules on access to genetic resources which form the basis of many 
biotech products. 
 
 
Agreements for the Reduction of Barriers to Trade 
 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
Various quality standards and technical regulations may be applied to biotech 
products, for example labelling rules for genetically modified foods or quality 
standards for pharmaceuticals.  These standards and rules are referred to by 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as technical barriers to trade.  In many 
cases, such technical barriers will be justified, for example to prevent 
deceptive practices, but they can also be used as unjustified barriers to trade.  
The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT Agreement) of the WTO 
aims to remove these unjustified barriers and to encourage harmonisation of 
legitimate technical barriers in order to further facilitate trade. 
 
Where such technical regulations and standards are in place for the protection 
of human, animal or plant health they come under the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).  This 
Agreement also aims to remove unjustified barriers to trade and to harmonise 
legitimate standards and rules. 
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 Technical regulations and standards are specifically defined in Annex 1 of the 
TBT Agreement.  SPS measures are defined in Annex A of SPS Agreement. 
 
Both agreements incorporate the requirement for all rules to be scientifically 
justified, i.e. based on scientific risk assessment.  Where international 
standards exist states are encouraged to use them as the basis for their 
national measures which will then be considered compliant with the 
Agreements.  The SPS Agreement particularly refers to standards produced 
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Office International des Epizooties 
and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (Article 
3.4 and Annex A.3). 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The WTO was established in 1995 and the SPS and TBT Agreements were 
part of its founding Agreements.  They are legally-binding for all WTO 
members, it currently has 149. 
 
Agreements on Intellectual Property Protection 
 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) provides for minimum standards of protection for 
intellectual property rights.  It covers a range of intellectual property rights, but 
its provisions on patents are most relevant to the field of biotechnology.  All 
states are expected to have national measures to implement and enforce 
intellectual property rights.  In regard to patents, developing and least 
developed country members are granted extensions to the time periods in 
which they must apply such measures (see Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WTO, 20/11/01). 
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 Patents are granted for “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, as long as they are novel, involve an inventive step and 
are capable of industrial application” (Article 27.1).  Certain exclusions are 
allowed, particularly for the protection of public order, life, health, the 
environment and essential security interests (Article 29 and 73); “diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods”; and “plants and animals other than 
microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes” 
(Article 27.3).  The application of Article 27.3 is being kept under review by the 
Council for TRIPS. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
International protection of intellectual property began in 1883 with the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.  Since then most of the 
work in this area has been conducted by the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO – known from 1893 to 1970 as the United International 
Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property), which currently 
administers 23 treaties, and works closely with the WTO.  Rules on 
intellectual property were separate to those on reduction of barriers to trade 
until the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
TRIPs was adopted as one of the WTO’s founding agreements in 1995.  It is 
legally-binding for all WTO members, there are currently 149. 
 
 
The Patent Law Treaty and Patent Cooperation Treaty 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
These treaties facilitate applications for patents in more than one country.  
The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) created a single international 
application system; the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) contains additional 
provisions on the application process.  Both have accompanying sets of 
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regulations that provide further details of the system and process. Under the 
PCT, an application can be filed as an international application in any of its 
member states, for as many member states as the applicant chooses (Article 
3).  The PCT system uses International Search Authorities (ISAs) to ensure 
the invention is novel.  Applicants also have the option of having an 
international preliminary examination conducted prior to making international 
applications.  This preliminary examination will inform them about whether 
their invention meets the patenting criteria (Article 33). 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The PCT was adopted in 1970 (and amended in 1979, 1984 and 2001) and 
the PLT was adopted in 2000.  They are both administered by the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation.  They are legally-binding.  The PCT has 
133 States Parties and the PLT has 14. 
 
 
The Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of 
Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
When filing for a patent on novel microorganisms it will often be necessary to 
submit samples of the microorganism as part of the examination process.  
This is in order to meet disclosure criteria, i.e. sufficient detail needs to be 
provided for the invention to be reproduced.  A written description alone might 
not allow this in regard to novel microorganisms.  Under the Budapest Treaty, 
which also covers plasmids and tissue cultures, applicants may leave the 
sample(s) with a single International Depositary Authority, rather than needing 
to make separate deposits in each state in which patent applications are 
being made. 
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Development and Current Status 
 
The Budapest Treaty was adopted in 1977 and is administered by the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation.  There are currently 37 International 
Depositary Authorities.  The Treaty is legally-binding and has 65 States 
Parties. 
 
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV Convention) provides a system of intellectual property protection for 
plant varieties in the form of plant variety or plant breeders’ rights.  Plants may 
alternatively be patented under other agreements.  Plant variety rights operate 
in a similar way to patents, allowing the developer to benefit from their 
commercial exploitation.  A plant variety is defined in the Convention as: 
 
“a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest 
known rank, which grouping…can be 
- defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting 
from a given genotype or combination of genotypes, 
- distinguished from any other plant grouping by the 
expression of at least one of the said characteristics and 
- considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being 
propagated unchanged” 
(Article 1) 
 
Plant varieties must fulfil four criteria of novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and 
stability, to be eligible for plant variety protection (Article 5).  These terms are 
given full definition in Articles 6-9 of the Convention.  Applications for 
protection are made to a designated authority in whichever member state the 
applicant wishes to use first.  That authority examines the application on 
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compliance with the four criteria.  The protection provided by the plant variety 
right extends to: production; reproduction; conditioning for propagation; sale 
or offering for sale; export; import; and stocking for any of those purposes 
(Article 14).  It does not cover private, non-commercial or experimental use 
(Article 15).  The operation of the Convention is overseen by the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The UPOV Convention was adopted in 1961 and entered into force in 1968.  
It has been amended in 1972, 1978 and 1991.  It is legally-binding and has 61 
States Parties. 
 
Agreements on Access to Genetic Resources 
 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGR) is designed to ensure the maintenance and sustainable use of a 
broad range of plant genetic resources, which are vital to food security.  Its 
objectives are stated in Article 1 as:  
 
“the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable 
agriculture and food security.” 
 
The main mechanism used by the treaty is the Multilateral System of Access 
and Benefit-Sharing.  It covers selected plant genetic resources (PGR) that 
are important for food security (listed in Annex 1 to the Treaty).  States are 
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expected to grant access to the resources, over which they have sovereign 
rights, through this system for the purposes of research or breeding for food 
and agriculture.  Access is not to be granted for “chemical, pharmaceutical 
and/or other non-food/feed industrial uses” (Article 12.3.g).  If it were to result 
in restricted access to the system’s PGR, intellectual property rights must not 
be claimed (Article 12.3.d). 
 
Benefits from the use of the system’s PGR are to be:  
 
“shared fairly and equitably through the following mechanisms: 
the exchange of information, access to and transfer of 
technology, capacity-building, and the sharing of the benefits 
arising from commercialization” 
(Article 13.2) 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) initiated work on PGR with two 
resolutions in 1983 which adopted an International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources and established the Commission on Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA).  Work to revise the Undertaking began in 
1993 and the ITPGR was adopted in 2001.  It entered into force in 2004 and 
has 106 States Parties. 
 
The Bonn Guidelines on Access to and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the 
Benefits Arising from the Utilisation of Genetic Resources 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The Bonn Guidelines provide guidance to states and other stakeholders on 
access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing, particularly for states in 
creating policy, legislative or administrative measures, and for other 
stakeholders in negotiation of access and benefit-sharing agreements.  The 
Guidelines also contain provisions on capacity-building, technology transfer 
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and poverty alleviation.  A system of written prior informed consent is 
recommended for access to genetic resources, and mutually agreed terms 
should be negotiated for benefit-sharing. States are advised to establish 
national information points to respond to queries on access and benefit-
sharing.   
 
Development and Current Status 
 
A key objective of the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity was “the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” 
(CBD, Article 1).  The CBD’s Conference of the Parties decided to examine 
the development of guidance in 2000 and adopted the Guidelines in 2002.  
They are not legally-binding. 
 
 
References/Links 
 
Official Texts: 
 
SPS Agreement – http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.doc. 
  
TBT Agreement – http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.doc. 
 
TRIPS Agreement – http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.doc. 
 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health – 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.  
 
Patent Cooperation Treaty – http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/articles/atoc.htm.   
 
Regulations Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty – 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/rules/rtoc1.htm. 
 
Patent Law Treaty – http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/plt/trtdocs_wo038.html. 
 
Regulations Under the Patent Law Treaty – 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/plt/trtdocs_wo039.html. 
 
Budapest Treaty – 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/budapest/trtdocs_wo002.html. 
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List of International Depositary Authorities Under the Budapest Treaty – 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/budapest/idalist.doc.  
 
UPOV Convention – 
http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/index.html. 
 
ITPGR – ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf. 
 
Bonn Guidelines – http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/socio-
eco/benefit/bonn.asp.  
 
 
Official Organisations: 
 
World Trade Organisation – http://www.wto.org/. 
 
World Intellectual Property Organisation – http://www.wipo.int/. 
 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants – http://www.upov.int/. 
 
Food and Agriculture Organisation – http://www.fao.org/. 
 
Convention on Biodiversity Secretariat – http://www.biodiv.org/.   
 
 
Other: 
 
Work on Article 27.3 of TRIPS – 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm.  
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6) DRUGS CONTROL 
 
Relevance of the Area to the Control of Biotechnology 
 
Biotechnology is enabling the development and production of many novel 
drugs, with huge potential benefits to human health.  It is important to ensure 
adequate international supply of drugs for medical and scientific purposes but 
there is a long history of diversion to illicit channels, which requires 
coordinated international efforts to control.  Misuse of drugs, including in sport, 
causes harm to both the individual involved and to societies as a whole. 
 
 
United Nations Drugs Conventions 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The three United Nations Drugs Conventions – the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 
Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances – all aim to reduce the illicit international drugs trade, while 
ensuring a sufficient supply for licit uses.  The Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances contain provisions on 
monitoring and countering the illicit drugs trade, including punishment and 
deterrence of drugs offences.  They operate on the basis of Schedules (lists) 
of controlled substances and preparations, which can be regularly updated.  
The manufacture, trade and distribution of scheduled substances require 
licensing.  Both Conventions require states to submit regular reports and 
estimates of national drug production and requirements, and any 
imports/exports, which are used by the International Narcotics Control Board 
to construct a picture of the international drug supply and demand situation. 
 
The Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances extends coverage to additional materials and equipment 
(contained within the ‘Red List’) and to additional offences, listed in detail in 
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Article 3, including “possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic substances for personal consumption” and possession, transfer, 
conversion or use of property gained through other offences. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council established the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs in 1946 to oversee international drugs control policy.  The 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was developed to replace a range of 
earlier agreements and was adopted in 1961, and entered into force in 1975.  
Coverage was extended in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 
which was adopted in 1971 and entered into force in 1976.  The third 
Convention (Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances) extended coverage to trafficking offences and was adopted in 
1988, entering into force in 1990.  Two organisations work alongside the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs – the International Narcotics Control Board 
(created under the 1961 Convention) and the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (established in 1997).  The Conventions are all legally-binding.  
There are 180 States Parties to both the 1961 and 1988 Conventions, and 
179 States Parties to the 1971 Convention. 
 
 
The World Anti-Doping Code 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) aims to deter, prevent, and punish the 
use of banned substances and methods to confer competitive advantage in 
sporting events.  It is aimed at athletes and athlete support personnel, and is 
expected to be used by national, regional and international sporting bodies.  It 
sets out offences and sanctions and establishes routines and procedures for 
testing, with a particular emphasis on the use of no-advance-notice testing.  
The Code uses a Prohibited List of banned substances and methods, which is 
updated annually by the World Anti-Doping Association (WADA).  The 
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Prohibited List includes the method of ‘gene-doping’ – “The non-therapeutic 
use of cells, genes, genetic elements, or of the modulation of gene expression, 
having the capacity to enhance athletic performance,” (Point M3, the 2007 
Prohibited List). 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The International Olympic Committee established a list of banned substances 
in 1967 and began testing athletes at the 1968 Olympic Games.  Some other 
sports bodies also conducted tests for certain substances, but it was not until 
the end of the 20th century that efforts to coordinate international standards 
took place.  In 1999 the WADA was established and immediately began work 
on producing an anti-doping code, which was adopted in 2003, and 
operational in time for the 2004 Olympic Games.  Its signatories are sporting 
organisations rather than governments, and currently 580 organisations are 
listed as having accepted the Code. 
 
 
International Convention Against Doping in Sport 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The International Convention Against Doping in Sport (ICADS) is designed to 
provide formal governmental support for the rules of the World Anti-Doping 
Code.  It incorporates the WADC’s Prohibited List.  States agree to provide 
the necessary legislative and administrative support to national sports 
organisations for fulfilment of their obligations under the Code. 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
In March 2003 governments signed up to the Copenhagen Declaration on 
Anti-Doping in Sport.  This expressed political support for the WADC but was 
not legally-binding.  The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation began work on drafting a legally-binding convention in support of 
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the Code and the ICADS was adopted in October 2005. It currently has 18 
States Parties but requires 30 for entry into force. 
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Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Under International Control, 10th 
Edition, January 2006 – http://www.incb.org/incb/red_list.html.  
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World Anti-Doping Association – http://www.wada-ama.org/. 
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United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation – 
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Report of the INCB for 2005 – 
http://www.incb.org/incb/annual_report_2005.html. 
 
Issue 1 2005 Play True – Gene Doping – http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/Play_True_01_2005_en.pdf.  
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7) SOCIAL AND ETHICAL IMPACTS OF HUMAN GENETICS 
 
Relevance of the Area to the Control of Biotechnology 
 
Research and development in human genetics carries great promise, 
particularly for the treatment and prevention of disease, but many of the 
techniques involved raise serious ethical issues, and challenge social values.  
Many questions are raised, for example: 
 
• To what extent should selection of embryos be allowed?  
• When are essentially eugenic choices acceptable? 
• Who will control the knowledge produced? 
• Are we open to new forms of discrimination?  
• Will new technologies be available to all?  
 
Some degree of international leadership is needed on these issues and 
regularly coordination is required, as currently activities banned in one 
country/region are easily relocated elsewhere. 
 
 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The main aim of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights (UDHGHR) is to establish principles for the protection of 
human rights during the development and application of human genetic 
technologies.  It particularly emphasises that people’s rights are to be 
respected regardless of their genetic characteristics (see for example Article 
2a).  Any research involving an individual’s genome must have that person’s 
prior informed consent, and all data gathered must be kept confidential.  Any 
research and practices “contrary to human dignity” should not be allowed – 
human reproductive cloning is given as an example of such research (Article 
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11).  Freedom of research is supported (Article 14) and its applications should 
be aimed at relieving suffering and improving health, with benefits available to 
all (Article 12). 
 
Development and Current Status 
 
The development of the four declarations covered in this section is outlined at 
the end of the section. 
 
 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
Picking up on the principles outlined in the UDHGHR the International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data (IDHGD) focuses more specifically on 
how data gathered in human genetics research, application and use should 
be treated.  It covers human genetic data, human proteomic data and the 
samples from which they are derived.  It covers collection, processing, 
storage and use.  Human genetic data are granted special status because: 
 
“(i) they can be predictive of genetic predispositions 
concerning individuals; 
(ii) they may have a significant impact on the family, including 
offspring, extending over generations, and in some instances 
on the whole group to which the person concerned belongs; 
(iii) they may have cultural significance for persons or groups.” 
(Article 4a) 
 
The need for prior informed consent is emphasised, and it should be up to the 
individual whether or not they receive the research results.  Data must be kept 
confidential and discrimination avoided.  Any benefits from human genetic 
research are to be shared with “society as a whole and the international 
community” (Article 19). 
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 Development and Current Status 
 
The development of the four declarations covered in this section is outlined at 
the end of the section. 
 
 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBEHR) aims to 
establish key ethical principles to guide governmental and societal responses 
to developments in medicine and the life sciences, particularly as they relate 
to humans.  The key principles include: 
 
• Protection of human rights; 
• Respect for human dignity; 
• Equitable access to scientific and technological developments; 
• Recognition of the importance of freedom of scientific research; 
• Minimisation of harm and maximisation of benefits; 
• Respect for privacy, equality and justice; 
• Avoidance of discrimination on biological grounds (including genetic); 
• Sharing of benefits; 
• Promotion of health; 
• Assessment and management of risks; and 
• Prevention of illegal activities. 
 
In regard to promoting health, scientific and technological development should 
aim towards improving access to medicines and health care; providing 
adequate nutrition and water; improving living conditions; and reducing 
poverty, illiteracy and marginalisation (Article 14). 
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Development and Current Status 
 
The development of the four declarations covered in this section is outlined at 
the end of the section. 
 
 
United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning 
 
Key Aims and Provisions 
 
The United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning (UNDHC) applies the 
principles of the UDHGHR to the area of human cloning, which it recognises 
as a threat to human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms.  States 
are to take all necessary measures to protect human life “in applications of the 
life sciences” (point a) and prohibit “all forms of human cloning” (point b) and 
other applications which are “contrary to human dignity” (point c).  
Controversially, the UNDHC does not distinguish between reproductive and 
therapeutic cloning, and this has resulted in limited international support for 
the Declaration. 
 
Development and Current Status of the Four Declarations 
 
The UDHGHR, IDHGD and UDBEHR were all developed by UNESCO.  The 
UNDHC was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly but used the 
principles of the UDHGHR as its basis.  UNESCO established a bioethics 
programme within its social and human sciences sector in 1993 and work on 
the UDHGHR also began at this time.  It was adopted in 1997.  Work on the 
IDHGD began in 2001 and it was adopted in 2003.  Drafting of the UDBEHR 
began in 2004 and it was adopted in 2005.  While all three declarations were 
adopted unanimously by UNESCO’s General Conference, they are not 
legally-binding. 
 
Work on drafting the UNDHC began within the UN General Assembly’s 6th 
Committee in 2001.  It was originally intended to take the form of a legally-
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binding prohibition but consensus could not be reached on the issue of 
therapeutic human cloning, and in 2004 the General Assembly instructed the 
6th Committee to draft a non-binding political declaration instead.  The 
Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly in March 2005 in 
Resolution 59/280.  The vote, of those states present, was 84 for, 34 against 
and 37 abstentions.  The for figure accounts for less than half of the UN’s 191 
member states. 
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PART II  
 
KEY POINTS FOR THE SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE 
 
The Sixth Review Conference for the BTWC takes place in Geneva from 20th 
November – 8th December 2006.  This Review Conference provides an 
extremely important opportunity for States Parties to review the operation of 
the Convention and promote its effective implementation.  No Final 
Declaration reviewing the provisions of the Convention was made at the Fifth 
Review Conference, and scientific and technological developments in the life 
sciences have continued to advance rapidly in the intervening period. 
 
The Bradford University based Project on Strengthening the Biological 
Weapons Convention produced a detailed paper in September 2006 titled Key 
Points for the Sixth Review Conference3 to assist States Parties in developing 
language for the Final Declaration.  The main points of its chapter “Successful 
Outcomes for the Review Conference” are summarised here, along with 
points made about specific articles of particular relevance to control of the 
biotechnology revolution.  The full document is available online at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/key6rev/contents.htm.  
 
Eleven key successful outcomes for the Review Conference are outlined in 
the paper, covering: 
 
1. The Final Declaration; 
2. Universality; 
3. National Implementation; 
4. Education, Outreach and Codes of Conduct; 
5. Article V Consultation and Cooperation Procedures; 
6. Confidence-Building Measures; 
                                                 
3 Graham S. Pearson, Nicholas A. Sims & Malcolm R. Dando (eds), Strengthening the Biological 
Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Sixth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department 
of Peace Studies, September 2006.  Accessible through: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc.  
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7. Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Implementation of 
the Convention; 
8. Article VI Investigations; 
9. Assistance 
10. International Cooperation; and 
11. Interim Support Structures. 
 
1. Final Declaration 
 
It is recommended that the Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference 
provides “a comprehensive article by article review of the Convention” in a 
cumulative manner – using the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review 
Conference as its basis, and building on this (p.24). 
 
2. Universality 
 
It is recommended that the Sixth Review Conference take action towards 
achieving universality of participation using an ‘achievement timeline’ and with 
the aim of increasing the number of States Parties to 180 by the Seventh 
Review Conference (2011). 
 
3. National Implementation 
 
It is recommended that national implementation measures cover “the full 
scope of the prohibitions contained in the Convention” and should be 
extended “to the control and monitoring of relevant dual-use materials and 
technologies” (p.29) and “to counter the continuing threat posed by biological 
and toxin weapons whether by States or by sub-State actors.” (p.30). It is also 
recommended that, to increase participation in the implementation of national 
measures, assistance should be provided to assist States in developing and 
adopting appropriate measures.  For this it is suggested that an ‘achievement 
timeline’ be set of two-thirds of States Parties having adopted national 
implementation legislation by the Seventh Review Conference (p.31). 
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4. Education, Outreach and Codes of Conduct 
 
Here, it is recommended that: 
 
“an annual meeting of States Parties prepared for by a 
Meeting of Experts… [take place in] the intersessional period 
before the Seventh Review Conference to consider the topic: 
Education and outreach for all those concerned with the life 
sciences.” (p.32). 
 
5. Article V Consultation and Cooperation Procedures 
 
It is recommended that the consultation and cooperation procedures under 
Article V be reviewed, particularly “in the light of the experience gained in the 
1997 implementation of them and the developments in the international scene 
since then”, and reaffirmed or amended as necessary (p.33). 
 
6. Confidence-Building Measures 
 
The Sixth Review Conference is unlikely to have time to deal fully with work to 
improve CBMs, which could include: 
- Review of existing CBMs and their format; 
- Proposals for new CBMs; 
- Provision for electronic submission and circulation; 
- Collation, translation and elaboration procedures; and 
- Provision of assistance. 
(p.36). 
 
Instead, it is recommended that a Meeting of States Parties, preceded by a 
Meeting of Experts, be held in 2007 “to consider and decide how to improved 
the effectiveness of the CBM process” (p.36). 
 
 
50 
Genomics Monitor     Issue No. 1     November 2006 
7. Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Implementation of the 
Convention 
 
For work on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the 
implementation of the Convention, an additional meeting to the Review 
Conference is recommended.  This would be “an ‘ad hoc’ Meeting of Experts 
from States Parties”, to be held in 2007, “to consider future action to 
strengthen the Convention” (p.37). 
 
8. Article VI Investigations 
 
Two main recommendations are made regarding Article VI investigations.  
First, that the procedure for making a complaint about breach of obligations 
(under Article VI.1) be elaborated.  Suggested wording for this is: 
 
“1. The State Party lodging a complaint should identify which 
obligation under the Convention it considers has been 
breached and in what manner the breach has occurred. 
2. The State Party lodging the complaint should compile a 
report containing possible evidence relating to the alleged 
breach of obligations and the evidence therein should be 
validated to the extent possible. 
3. The State Party lodging a complaint should implement the 
procedure as soon as possible after the alleged breach of the 
obligations under the Convention has taken place.” (p.40) 
 
Second, it is recommended that States Parties: 
 
“consider what steps are needed to ensure that the Secretary-
General’s mechanism for the investigation of cases of alleged 
use of biological and toxin weapons would indeed be effective 
and credible.” 
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9. Assistance 
 
There are recommendations made for both emergency and other assistance.  
For emergency assistance it is suggested that a Meeting of States Parties, 
preceded by a Meeting of Experts should be held “To develop a procedure for 
the provisions of timely emergency assistance to States Parties on request.” 
(p.41). This subject may be broadened to developing “a procedure for the 
provision of timely assistance to States Parties on request.”  (p.41). This 
would include other forms of assistance, for example for national 
implementation; preparation of CBM returns; and surveillance, detection, 
diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases (p.41). 
 
10. International Cooperation 
 
To enhance international cooperation the adoption of a new CBM for 
transparency of Article X cooperation (scientific cooperation for peaceful 
purposes) is suggested.  This would form part of the work of and annual 
Meeting of States Parties, preceded by a Meeting of Experts, on facilitating 
international cooperation between States Parties. 
 
11. Interim Supportive Structures 
 
In order to develop interim supportive structures to operate before an 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons is established, it is 
recommended that a second part to the Article XII Review Conferences 
section be added to the Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference, 
authorising: “the President and General Committee to undertake continuing 
tasks after the end of the Conference in order to provide interim strengthening 
structures in support of the Convention.” (p.44). Suggested structures include: 
a representative Intersessional Committee of Oversight or Annual Meeting of 
States Parties empowered to take decisions; and advisory panels and a 
standing secretariat to support it (p.44). 
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Along with these recommendations for successful outcomes, the paper 
provides detailed information on the cumulative development of the provisions 
of each Article through previous Final Declarations, and for each Article 
suggests possible wording for the Sixth Review Conference Final Declaration.  
Article I – Scope and Article IV – National Implementation have particular 
relevance for control of the biotechnology revolution. 
 
Article I - Scope 
 
Article I of the BTWC contains the prohibitions that: 
 
“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any 
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise 
acquire or retain: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever 
their origin or method of production of types or in quantities 
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes;” 
 
The Final Declarations of Review Conferences 1 – 4 all reaffirmed the 
importance of this provision, and confirmed that it covers all scientific and 
technological developments.  It is strongly recommended that this be 
continued in the Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference.  Following 
the suggested cumulative process, the paper considers that three matters 
particularly require additional/altered wording.  First, “that the scientific and 
technological developments that could be of concern apply to animals and 
plants as well as human beings.” (p.66). Second, that it should be made 
clear in the wording “that developments throughout the whole of the life 
sciences could potentially be of concern” (p.66).  And, third, that the fifth 
paragraph of the Fourth Review Conference’s Final Declaration be extended 
so that it clearly covers “prions, proteins and bioregulators and their 
synthetically produced analogues and components.” (p.67). 
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It is also suggested that the language of the Second Review Conference Final 
Declaration on the coverage of “all natural or artificially created microbial or 
other biological agents or toxins” be used in preference to that in the Fourth 
Review Conference Final Declaration, as it is less ambiguous on the coverage 
of synthetic biology (p.67).  Finally, this section of the paper recommends that 
the Conference encourages the biomedical community to be “much more 
proactive in raising awareness of the dangers [of some experiments] and 
introducing effective mechanisms of self-monitoring.” (p.67). 
 
Article IV – National Implementation 
 
In regard to Article IV, it has been made clear in previous Final Declarations, 
that this includes the need for education on the Convention’s provisions in the 
medical, scientific and military communities.  As part of the Inter-Review 
Conference Process a Meeting of States Parties was held on the content 
promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists.  It produced a 
report which recognised the value of voluntarily adopted codes of conduct for 
scientists in supporting the objectives of the Convention.  It is recommended 
that States Parties incorporate this issue in the Sixth Review Conference Final 
Declaration, including an additional paragraph in the Article IV section stating 
that the Conference notes the importance of “- Adoption of codes of conduct 
for those engaged in relevant areas of science and technology.” (p.129) along 
with more detailed language regarding the codes – including: principles; 
coordination; involvement of those who will be affected; and promulgation 
(pp.129-131).  Finally, this section of the paper recommends that a Meeting of 
States Parties, preceded by a Meeting of Experts, be held to consider 
“Education and outreach for all those concerned with the life sciences”, 
(p.131). 
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